We illustrate the corrosive e¤ect of even small amounts of adverse selection in an asset market and how it can lead to the total breakdown of trade. The problem is the failure of "market con…dence", de…ned as approximate common knowledge of an upper bound on expected losses. Small probability events can unravel market con…dence. We discuss the role of contagious adverse selection and the problem of "toxic assets" in the recent …nancial crisis.
Introduction
Some participants in …nancial markets have either private information or better expertise in evaluating new …nancial instruments and markets. This gives rise to adverse selection. Financial markets may nonetheless operate smoothly when there are su¢ cient gains from trade among traders without private information or expertise. In this case, expert traders are able to extract some rent from their expertise but there are enough gains from trade to fund these rents and yet allow mutually bene…cial trade.
However, as illustrated vividly by the recent …nancial crisis, …nancial markets appear to exhibit fragility where shocks to the economy can suddenly lead to abrupt breakdowns in markets. One element of such market breakdowns to be explored in our paper is the amplifying e¤ect of strategic complementarities in participation decisions and the ine¢ cient coordination among ordinary uninformed traders'participation decisions. If I am expecting other traders to run, then I expect that my trade will be with an expert trader who will take advantage of me. As an ordinary uninformed trader, my incentive to participate in the market is greater when other ordinary uninformed trader participate more.
An important insight from game theory is that in coordination problems, what matters is not so much what each agent knows about the returns to alternative actions, but rather what is common knowledge (or approximate common knowledge) between them. It is their shared understanding that matters. This insights …ts well with much commentary on …nancial markets suggesting that "market con…dence" is critical. We can give an interpretation of "market con…dence" as embodying such shared understanding. It is not enough that each market participant believes that the fundamentals are sound. Market con…dence requires that the fundamental soundness is commonly understood among market participants.
Our purpose in this paper is to develop a link between adverse selection in trading environments with game theoretic insights about coordination and common knowledge. We will shortly describe how our approach relates to the (large) literature on trade under adverse selection. Our main contribution is to highlight the importance of small departures from common knowledge, and what kinds of departures matter for the breakdown of trade.
We consider the following classic trading problem. It is common knowledge among two groups of traders -potential buyers and potential sellersthat an asset is worth 2c more to potential buyers than to potential sellers at every state of the world, where c > 0 is a known constant. Thus it is common knowledge that the ex post gains from trade are 2c. Ex ante welfare is thus equal to 2c times the probability of trade. From a welfare perspective, the traders should always trade with each other.
However, suppose that there is a small probability in each uninformed agent's mind, that his partner knows something that creates a large bene…t M to the partner at his expense. The "loss ratio" is the ratio of the expected losses of an uninformed agent ( M ) and his known gains from a split the di¤erence trade (c). In the benchmark case where the there is complete information about the expected loss ratio, it is intuitive that trade will take place if and only if the loss ratio M c is less than one. However, the more intriguing case is when there is incomplete information about the loss ratio. In other words, each agent is unsure exactly what his partner's perception of expected losses are. In such circumstances, the adverse selection can be shown to have a much more corrosive e¤ect where the fear of asymmetric information reverberates throughout the information structure and gets ampli…ed in the process. It is possible that even when the ex ante probability of adverse selection is very small, there can be a catastrophic breakdown in trade. Essentially, the incomplete information leads to an unraveling result in a coordination game among di¤erentially informed traders. Each uninformed trader would like to trade if the trading partner is also an uninformed trader. Otherwise, the trading partner is likely to be an informed party who will take advantage of the uninformed trader.
Drawing on the insights from the earlier literature on common knowledge, we can characterize the threshold condition for the sustainability of trade. At the core of our construction is the self-referential nature of "market con…dence". Loosely, market con…dence rests on approximate common knowledge of mutually bene…cial trade. The exact threshold depends on the loss ratio faced by the traders. The higher is the loss ratio, the more rigorous must be the notion of common knowledge that will sustain trade. Stated more precisely, a trader has market con…dence if he expects the proportion of regular traders who (themselves) have market con…dence exceeds his loss ratio. Notice that how this de…nition is self-referential and thus implicitly incorporates a notion of approximate common knowledge. We show that only traders with market con…dence participate in the market. To the extent that approximate common knowledge can be sensitive to the interaction of the payo¤ fundamentals with the information structure, it is possible that even small changes in the underlying parameters of the problem can lead to abrupt breakdowns of market con…dence, and hence of trade. Exploring the subtleties of how market con…dence depends on the parameters gives us a great deal of insight into the underlying economics of trade under adverse selection. In the penultimate section of our paper, we draw on the insights from our framework to revisit the breakdown in the market for securities based on subprime mortgages in the United States.
The outline of our paper is as follows. Before presenting our formal framework, we begin with a brief review of the literature on trade with adverse selection with an emphasis on how our results can be related to the insights gained from the existing literature. The formal framework is then presented in several stages. We start by stating the fundamentals of our trading environment and posit a trading institution where trade takes place if and only if both traders say 'yes'to a proposed trade at a price that splits the di¤erence. We then introduce adverse selection, and introduce the idea that the severity of the adverse selection can be a subject of incomplete information among the traders.
The core of our paper is the characterization of market con…dence in terms of approximate common belief and the demonstration that our notion of market con…dence is the right one when considering the occurrence of trade in equilibrium. Having introduced our key concepts in the initially stark setting, we follow up by showing that the insights from the simpli…ed setting can be embedded in more general settings, and that the intuitions from the common knowledge literature can help our understanding in these more general settings.
As we have ‡agged already, we conclude with a brief discussion of how our results can help to shed light on aspects of the subprime crisis. Before we embark on the main body of our paper, we begin with a brief survey of how our discussion links with the existing literature on trade with adverse selection.
Related Literature
In Akerlof (1970) and the classical adverse selection models that followed, there is market unravelling with equally informed traders on both sides of the market. We are concerned with situations where, on both sides of the market, some traders are informed and some are not informed. This then translates into a coordination problem among uninformed traders. This coordination problem among uninformed traders plays an explicit or implicit role in a wide variety of …nance models. Bhattacharya and Spiegel (1991) consider a competitive model of a market for a risky asset when there are gains from trade from risk sharing among a pool of uninformed traders, but there is a single informed trader. The price does not fully reveal the informed trader's information because of idiosyncratic motives for trade. Bhattacharya and Spiegel (1991) identify conditions under which there is a market breakdown (i.e., no trade). While the analysis is competitive rather than explicitly strategic, there are strategic complementarities in the sense that lower participation of uninformed traders in the market reduces the incentive of other uninformed traders to participate. This framework has been used to address questions such as when new securities can shut down markets (Bhattacharya, Reny and Spiegel (1995) ) and when public disclosure rules can mitigate the adverse selection problems (Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (2000) ). Pagano (1989) and Dow (2004) highlight the coordination problem among uninformed traders and draws implications for designing …nancial institutions. In these models, the coordination problem is among identical uninformed traders, so there is no role for considering what is or is not common knowledge among them. A distinctive feature of our analysis is the lack of common knowledge among uninformed traders.
A large literature in game theory examines the importance of what is or is not common knowledge or approximate common knowledge in coordination games. Rubinstein (1989) , Monderer and Samet (1989) and Carlsson and van Damme (2003) are key early contributions. The insight from this literature is that coordination -i.e., taking an action which is only optimal if others do so -requires approximate common knowledge. The methodological contribution of this paper is providing a tractable framework in which adverse selection generates a coordination problem among uninformed traders and then showing how the relevant common knowledge requirement for coordination can be expressed in terms of the underlying adverse selection problem.
We consider an environment where it is common knowledge that an object is worth more to buyers than to sellers, but there is a lack of common knowledge about a common value component. This environment is a classic one in the mechanism design literature, with Myerson (1985) being an early reference on optimal mechanisms in this setting. We analyze what happens in simple but realistic trading mechanisms but arbitrary beliefs and higher order beliefs of traders. Dang (2008 Dang ( , 2009 ) also examines what happens in this environment in simple trading mechanisms (ultimatum o¤er bargaining and double auction, respectively) with a simple information structure but endogenous information acquisition that gives rise to an endogenous lemons problem.
A number of papers have examined channels by which adverse selection may cause a market freeze. Adverse selection interacts with funding constraints in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) , and Kurlat (2009) These papers highlight the payo¤ structure of debt as a …nancial claim that minimizes the information sensitivity of asset returns. In such a setting, an aggregate shock may have a disproportionate impact because it increases the information sensitivity of asset returns and thus triggers adverse selection. Our own paper shares with these earlier papers the perspective that the arrival of information (not lack of "transparency") may trigger market collapse. However, our focus is on modelling the commonality of information in an abstract trading model, while Dang, Gorton and Holmstrom (2009) endogenize the choice of …nancial instrument and have endogenous information acquisition in a simpler informational environment.
The notion of market con…dence as approximate common knowledge ties in with a broader set of arguments on the importance of institutions that ensure common understanding, and common knowledge of the important fundamentals. We argued elsewhere (Morris and Shin (2007a) ) that there are important tradeo¤s between providing accuracy (individually correct beliefs) and commonality (approximate common knowledge of beliefs) for many problems in economics. Holmstrom (2009) has argued that this tradeo¤ is particularly important in thinking about the regulatory reforms on transparency, and the coarse nature of credit ratings. The coarse nature of the credit ratings may have a rationale in terms of promoting common understanding, at the expense of a …ner grid for the fundamentals. In Morris and Shin (2007a), we argue there coarse accounting standards can be seen as an institution that could potentially provide the commonality.
Our objective in this paper is to highlight the importance of commonality of information, and how the lack of such commonality can lead to sub-optimal outcomes. In order to emphasize our key theme, the model is deliberately stark, but we believe that our results shed much light on the broader problem of common knowledge and trade, as well as providing a spur for a more systematic investigation of the role of adverse selection in exacerbating the current …nancial crisis.
The Setting
There are N potential buyers and N potential sellers of an assets. Sellers each own one unit of the asset with private value v c, while buyers'valuations are v + c. It would be e¢ cient for all sellers to transfer their object to the buyers, who each have unit demand, say at a price of v which splits the gains from trade.
However, there is uncertainty about the common value component v: its expected value is v and it is equal to its expectation in what we'll refer to as the normal state with probability 1 2 . However, with probability , the asset is a "peach" and v = v + M and, with probability , the asset is a "lemon" with v = v M . Thus we have the following distribution of the value of the asset to the agents: state probability value to sellers value to buyers
There is adverse selection, with proportion q of both buyers and sellers informed of the true state, and proportion 1 q uninformed. We will implicitly assume throughout our analysis that qN , the number of informed agents, is an integer.
We have in mind the archetypal example where the asset in question is an asset-backed security backed by subprime mortgages, but where the quality of the mortgage pool depends sensitively on the region and date of their origination. The two groups of traders are equally well-informed most of the time, but we allow the possibility that one or other of the traders is better informed than his trading partner, and that the information could be positive or negative. The highly skewed payo¤s associated with subprime CDOs motivates payo¤s in the trading game, where for most of the time there are (small) gains from trade, but for a few states of the world, there are large payo¤ consequences of trade. See Coval, Jurek and Sta¤ord (2009) for an introduction to the economics of structured …nance.
Loss Ratio
If faced with an uninformed agent on the other side of the market (a probability 1 q event), an uninformed trade has an expected gain from trade of c. Thus we have the expression (1 q) c for an agent's expected gains from trade with an uninformed agent.
If faced with an informed agent on the other side of the market (a probability q event), an uninformed agent still hopes to get a gain from trade of c; but with probability , the informed agent will not participate in trade, and the agent will lose M + c. Thus expected losses from trade with an informed agent are q ( (M + c) c). An important parameter for us will be the agents'loss ratio:
when q is small and M is much larger than c. Another way of understanding this expression is to observe that the loss ratio is less that one, < 1, if and only if
Throughout the paper we will …x the gains from trade c as a constant. A convenient feature of our basic set up is that ex ante welfare (the sum of the agents'ex ante expected utility from trade) is simply 2c times the probability of trade. Ex ante welfare = 2c Probability of trade Buyers and sellers are randomly matched with each other. Each buyer and each seller are asked if they would like to trade at price v. If both say yes, they trade. If one says no, they do not. Clearly, informed buyers will buy if and only if the asset is normal or a peach, while informed sellers will sell if and only if the asset is normal or a lemon. We …rst consider the case where there is common knowledge of the structure of the model and ask if there is an equilibrium where uninformed agents trade. For an uninformed buyer who expected uninformed sellers to sell, the expected gains from trade will be
By (1), this is positive only if the loss ratio is less than 1. Thus if 1, there is an equilibrium where all agents trade. If > 1, the unique equilibrium has no agents trading.
Incomplete Information
Now suppose that there is not common knowledge about the parameters of the model. In particular, suppose that M is a random variable with possible support on (c; 1) and each informed and uninformed agent has his own assessment of M . Informed traders will have the same dominant strategy as before: informed buyers will buy if and only if the asset is normal or a peach, while informed sellers will sell if and only if the asset is normal or a lemon. For uninformed agents, their optimal strategy will be determined by their beliefs about M and the proportion of uninformed agents who trade (denoted by p). Gains from trade conditional on M will be
Now if there is uncertainty about M (and thus ) an agent will trade if and only if his expectation of the proportion of others trading exceeds his expected loss ratio. If we assume symmetry between sellers and buyers in their beliefs and higher order beliefs, an agent will trade if and only if 1. his expectation of the loss ratio is less than 1, 2. (1) is true and his expectation of the proportion of agents on other side of market for whom (1) is true is greater than his expectation of the loss ratio, 3. (2) is true and his expectation of the proportion of agents on other side of market for whom (2) is true is greater than his expectation of the loss ratio, 4. and so on...
While stated informally, this is an exact characterization of when trade is possible in equilibrium. As we will prove formally in Section 3, this in…nite list of statements above are equivalent to the following self-referential "…xed point," statement. Say that an agent has market con…dence if and only if his expectation of the proportion of agents with market con…dence is greater than his expected loss ratio. Now an agent trades if and only if he has market con…dence.
Characterizing Market Con…dence
We will formalize the self-referential idea of having "market con…dence" -namely, that an agent has market con…dence if his expectation of the proportion of agents with market con…dence is greater than his expected loss ratio, and show its equivalence to the iterative de…nition.
Suppose that we have a collection of N agents. Each agent has a set of possible types T i , where T i is a measurable set. We write i : T i ! (T i ) for agent i's beliefs about others types.
We will be interested in rectangular events on the type space. An rec-
, where p i : T i ! R, so p associates a number with each type. For a given rectangular event E, we will say that E is p i -believed by agent i if his expectation of the proportion of agents with types t j 2 T j is at least p i ; formally,
; .
Also write
If t 2 B p (E), then every agent p i -believes E. We will say that agent i has common p-belief of rectangular event E if
We will say that agent i has p-con…dence if
Thus agent i has p-con…dence if 1. p i is less than 1 2. agent i's expectation of the proportion of agents j for whom p j is less than 1 is at least p i 3. agent i's expectation of the proportion of agents for whom (1) and (2) are true is at least p i 4. and so on.
p-con…dence has the following simple …xed point characterization. Rectangular event E is p-evident if E C p (E), i.e., E i C p i (E) for all i. Now we have the following characterization result:
Proposition. Agent i has p-con…dence (t i 2 C p i ) if and only if there exists a p-evident rectangular event E with t i 2 E i .
The proof for the special case of two agents reduces to the characterization of state contingent p-belief in Morris and Shin (2007) , and the general argument is easily adapted, and so is omitted here. If each p i is the same for all types and all agents, then our de…nition of p-con…dence reduces to the characterization of common p-belief in Monderer and Samet (1989). In turn, for the special case where p = 1, our de…nition reduces to the classic result of Aumann (1976) linking iterative and …xed point de…nitions of common knowledge.
Our result links up with our analysis in Section 2 as follows. Suppose that for each agent i = 1; :::; N in this section, there is a corresponding buyer and seller in the model of Section 2. If we write i (t i ) for the expected loss ratio of type t i of agent i, and let
, then the analysis in Section 2 established that there is an equilibrium where agent i trades if and only if agent i has -con…dence, which we dubbed "market con…dence". The proposition formalizes the self-referential de…nition of market con…dence we reported in Section 2.
General Asset Returns and Trading Games
We now turn to how our result applies to more general contexts with general asset payo¤ distributions and trading games.
Asset Returns
Consider the model as before but assume that the common value component of the asset v = v+", where " is smoothly distributed according to symmetric density f ( ), so parameterizes asset returns. Informed sellers will trade only if v c = v + " c < v, i.e., if " < c. Informed buyers will trade only if v + c = v + " + c > v, i.e., if " > c. Thus a key parameter will be the probability under the distribution that returns in the tails will be more than c from the mean:
Another key parameter will be the expected deviation of the common value of the asset from its mean if returns are in one of the tails:
These will be the only parameters of returns that will matter in our trading game. In particular, for each distribution , there is a corresponding loss ratio de…ned as above:
Maintaining symmetry between beliefs and higher order beliefs of sellers and buyers, the analysis of Section 2 goes through exactly as before where an agents beliefs and higher order beliefs about determine his beliefs and higher order beliefs about his and other agents'loss ratio. Our ability to derive an exact characterization of when trade occurs relies on a couple of features of the model. We assume that traders are informed or uninformed (there is nothing in between). This is crucial to the analysis, since it means that adverse selection translates into a pure coordination problem, and agents'assessment of the loss ratio is not correlated with their assessment of the proportion of agents on the other side of the market trading. A more realistic modelling would allow for intermediate types. But as we explained in the introduction, we wanted to focus on the coordination element of adverse selection.
Double Auction
We assume that agents made a yes or no decision whether to trade at an expected price. This seems like a realistic assumption in our setting. However, it is easy to see that allowing trade at alternative prices will not generate signi…cantly more trade in this setting. To see this, consider a double auction setting where each trader proposes a price to trade and trade takes place at the average of the proposed prices only if the sell price is less than the buy price. Consider the following strategy pro…le in the double auction. All agents propose trade at price v if they have market con…dence. If they do not have market con…dence, informed sellers propose trade at v + c, informed buyers propose trade at v c, uninformed buyers propose trade at v M + c and uninformed sellers propose trade at v + M c.
To check that this an equilibrium, observe that an uninformed agent will never get any surplus if his trading partner does not have market con…dence, and he will maximize his surplus if his opponent has market con…dence if he proposes trade at price v. Thus under this strategy pro…le, he has essentially the same payo¤s as in the simple trading game. Now consider a seller with a lemon. His expected gain from proposing price v is (c + M ) times the probability he attaches to having an uninformed partner who believes in market con…dence. His expected gain from proposing price v M + c is 2c (1 q). So his strategy is optimal if there is a lower bound on the probability he attaches to his uninformed partner believing in market con…dence and M is su¢ ciently large relative to c.
Losing Market Con…dence
A large and rich foundational literature on higher order beliefs has established that attaining common knowledge or approximate common knowledge is di¤erent from and sometime orthogonal from attaining accurate information. We can brie ‡y illustrate this point by appealing to arguments used in the "global games" literature.
In Section 4.1, we discussed the case where the common value component of the asset's payo¤s was parameterized by and the loss ratio corresponding to was written as ( ). Let g ( ) be a prior probability density on and suppose now that ( ) were decreasing in , so higher states correspond to a lower loss ratio. Suppose each agent (buyers and sellers) observes a signal t i = + " i , where is a parameter measuring the size of noise and " i is a noise term distributed according to density f ( ) in the population. This information structure describes a type space as in Section 3, parameterized by , where each T i = R,
Now let be the point where the loss ratio is reduced to . Adapting arguments in the global games literature (see, e.g., Morris and Shin (2003)), one can show that, as ! 0, agent i has market con…dence (i.e., -con…dence) if and only if t i . Thus with small noisy signals, there is market con…dence only when the loss ratio is half as much as when there is common knowledge of the loss ratio. Now suppose that initially there is common knowledge of a loss ratio less than one and thus e¢ cient trade. Now suppose there is a shock to the system. Even if the loss ratio does not change much, if there is uncertainty about changes in the loss ratio (as described by the noisy information structure) that breaks down the common understanding supporting trade, there is a loss of market con…dence and collapse of trade.
Financial Crisis of 2007-2009
Our model is stylized but informed by the recent …nancial crisis. Before concluding the paper, we assess how the framework developed so far can help us to understand the events in the recent …nancial crisis.
The problem of "toxic assets" …rst hit the headlines when the subprime crisis heralded the beginning of the global …nancial crisis in August 2007. The market for certain asset-backed securities, especially those backed by subprime residential mortgages was the …rst to su¤er extreme illiquidity, as trading slowed to a trickle and market-clearing prices became virtually impossible to establish. 1 However, as the …nancial crisis worsened over the subsequent months, the illiquidity in the asset-backed securities market continued to linger, morphing into a more chronic solvency problem for the banking sector as a whole. Resolving the problem of toxic legacy assets has become a priority for policy makers as they have attempted to grapple with the problem by unveiling policy initiatives such as the PPIP (public-private investment program) that attempt to inject additional balance sheet capacity into the …nancial system.
The opaqueness of the asset-backed securities market and the attendant potential for adverse selection has frequently been blamed for the sudden drying up of liquidity. Yet, there is a puzzle at the heart of the crisis. Uncertainty about the true value of an asset should not invariably lead to the breakdown of trade. The stock market is a live illustration of how …nancial markets are normally well adapted to aggregating the diverse information of traders and arriving at a market-clearing price. More reasoned arguments seem necessary to explain satisfactorily the breakdown of trade in the subprime asset-backed securities.
The questions can be posed starkly by examining the ‡uctuations in the margins involved in collateralized borrowing arrangements such through sale and repurchase agreements (repos). In a repurchase agreement, the borrower sells a security at a price below the current market price on the understanding that it will buy it back at a …xed date at a known price. The di¤erence between the current market price and the price at which the security is sold is known as the "haircut", and ‡uctuates widely with shifts in market conditions. The size of the haircut determines the degree of leverage that the borrower may attain, so that an increase in the haircut is associated with a decrease in the leverage achieved by the borrower. It is by now well recognized that the global …nancial crisis that began in the summer of 2007 set o¤ a dramatic deleveraging episode on the part of …nancial intermediaries, leading to a generalized run from the leveraged sector as a whole. 2 The table below is from IMF's Global Financial Stability Report (IMF (2008) In particular, notice that the haircut on equities increases only marginally from 15% to 20%, even though equities are arguably the most volatile in terms of price ‡uctuations and hence subject to the greatest fundamental uncertainty. In contrast, the haircut on asset-backed securities (ABSs) increase from 3 -5% to a massive 50 -60%. Even this very high haircut increased further after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, e¤ectively shutting o¤ the repo market based on ABSs (see Gorton and Metrick (2009)) .
A better handle on the problem comes from the recognition that the natural holders of asset-backed securities are leveraged entities such as hedge funds and …nancial intermediaries. as hedge funds, commercial banks and investment banks. As such, the motivation to conserve scarce balance sheet capacity would have …gured prominently in the willingness to trade toxic securities, as well as to lend against them as collateral. If a bank were to accept an illiquid security as collateral in a repo, the bank is vulnerable to a shock that necessitates the selling of the security to raise cash. In the absence of a buyer, the bank may have to sell it at …resale prices. Acharya, Gale and Yorulmazer (2009) is a recent paper that formalizes this logic. The large haircuts on some securities could be seen as a response by leveraged entities to the potential drying up of trading possibilities in the asset-backed securities (ABS) market. The equity market, in contrast, is populated mainly with non-leveraged entities such as mutual funds, pension funds, insurance companies and households, and hence is less vulnerable to the drying up of trading partners.
However, this line of reasoning begs the crucial question of why the market for the ABS security is so illiquid, and why it is so di¢ cult to …nd terms of trade that would be mutually acceptable to buyer and seller. It is this question that we address in our paper. The answer to this question is the …nal piece in the jigsaw that completes the picture and answers the key questions on the propagation mechanism behind the current …nancial crisis.
The starting point of our analysis was adverse selection resulting from information asymmetries on the true value of the asset. For asset-backed securities, the heterogeneity of the underlying loan pools that back the secu-rities gives ample scope for greater expertise and information in ascertaining the fundamental value of the securities. When overall economic fundamentals are strong, such asymmetric information need not matter for the value of the particular asset-backed security, since such securities are debt claims that are insensitive to the value of the underlying claims, as noted by Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) . However, when a shock impacts the economy (such as reversal of the housing market that ultimately underpins the value of the security), then the true value of the debt security becomes more sensitive to private information and the asymmetric information begins to exert an in ‡uence in the trading decisions.
Moreover, the new breed of asset-backed securities such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) written on subprime mortgages have skewed payo¤s in which they retain their value close to face value in most states of nature, but su¤er catastrophic loss in extremely bad states (see Coval, Jurek and Sta¤ord (2009)). It is this extreme skewness of the payo¤s that lead to the most drastic failure of trade.
Concluding Remarks
Our result on the importance of approximate common knowledge in enabling mutually bene…cial trade reiterates the importance of shared understanding as in many other areas of economic life. Arguably, credit ratings and accounting numbers also derive part of their importance from common understanding. Holmstrom (2009) argues that the coarse nature of credit ratings serve this importance purpose, and that misguided attempts to enhance "transparency"by making …ner distinctions may undermine this useful purpose. Elsewhere (Morris and Shin (2007a)), we have argued that accounting numbers also serve the important role of generating shared understanding. There are inevitable tradeo¤s. The imperative for common understanding can sometimes detract from the precision of accounting numbers. Common understanding is predicated on the lowest common denominator -the coarsest shared framework among a set of disparate individuals. So, the coarser is the information, the greater is the chance that the information can be understood by all. However, coarse information is also imprecise information. The ‡ipside of "common understanding" is "unsophisticated". When communication is based on the coarsest individual information, there will be many individuals who are capable of handling more …nely nuanced and complex usage. Hence there may be welfare losses when the opportunity to utilize the greater sophistication is forgone in favor of simplicity. However, there is great virtue in simplicity's ability to generate common understanding.
When common understanding is important, it is possible that greater precision of information can be detrimental to welfare if the greater precision comes at the expense of greater fragmentation, or if the greater precision of information leads to an exacerbation of externalities in the use of information that detracts from overall welfare. Accountants make the important distinction between disclosure of information (e.g., reporting of numbers in a footnote) and recognition (e.g., inclusion in pro…t and loss statement) and observe that the latter has a larger empirical impact than the former (Barth, et al. 2003; Espahbodi, et al. 2002) . The greater impact of recognized numbers presumably re ‡ects greater common understanding of that information.
In this paper, we have seen the interaction between asymmetric information and the coordination motive generated by that asymmetric information. We have seen the potentially corrosive e¤ect of even small amounts of adverse selection in an asset market and how it can lead to the total breakdown of trade. In our model, there is common knowledge among two groups of traders that an asset is worth strictly more to the buyer than the seller at every state of the world, and yet there can be a total breakdown of trade. The problem is the failure of common understanding, and in particular what we have termed "market con…dence", de…ned as approximate common knowledge of an upper bound on expected losses.
